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BOOK REVIEWS
Земята и хората през ХVІІ – първите десетилетия на ХVІІІ 
век. Овладяване и организация на аграрното и социалното 
пространство на Централните и Южните Балкани под османска 
власт, Академично издателство [Land and People – in the Seventeenth 
Century and the First Decades of  the Eighteenth Century. Reclamation 
and Organization of  the Agrarian and Social Space in the Central and 
Southern Balkans under Ottoman Rule]. By Stefka Parveva. Sofia: Prof. 
Marin Drinov Academic Publishing House, 2011. 484 pp. 
The subject of  land in the Balkans and its agricultural reclamation and use during 
the period of  Ottoman rule has been extensively studied by scholars. This book, 
however, is based on the discovery of  sources that are essentially different from 
what has been previously known and used, sources which shed light on new 
aspects of  the agrarian issue. These sources are two types of  population and 
land survey (defters) that were unusual in the Ottoman administration. The first 
type of  defter was compiled in the late 1660s and early 1670s. They include a 
description of  the land of  the individual rural households and the common 
land in the village territory of  21 villages and two separate mezraas in the Edirne 
nahiyes of  Üsküdar and Ada. These defters are held in the Oriental Department 
of  the National Library in Sofia.
The second type of  defter offers a description of  the population and its 
property in the towns, villages and çiftliks in the kazas of  Arcadia and Anavarin 
in the southwestern Peloponnese. The survey was compiled after the re-conquest 
of  the Peloponnese by the Ottomans from the Venetian Republic and dated 
January 15, 1716. The defter of  the two kazas is part of  the collection of  the 
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul.
The information included in these documents is different from the standard 
content of  tapu tahrir defters as they were compiled until the end of  the sixteenth 
century. The analysis of  these atypical sources clarifies certain aspects of  agrarian 
and social life in the Balkans during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
that have generally remained understudied. This study attempts to reconstruct the 
rural and the urban agrarian landscape and the prevailing patterns of  land use. It 
also traces the economic behaviour of  peasants and townsmen in the process of  
reclamation and organisation of  the land belonging to the village and the town 
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territory. Furthermore, the new information regarding family landholdings and 
the yield ratios of  cultivated products enables the author to assess the productive 
capacity of  the raiyet çiftlik and the quantitative components of  the system, i.e. 
harvest, consumption, taxation, and remaining surplus per household. It also 
enables her to seek answers to a number of  questions, including for instance 
the extent to which agricultural production was adequate to support a family 
and create a marketable surplus, whether or not the agrarian system offered 
incentives to the producer, and where one might draw the limits of  poverty and 
wealth during the period (the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries). In 
addition to these sources, Parveva also makes valuable use of  archival sources 
and studies that she herself  published or discovered in the Archives in Sofia, 
Istanbul and Athens.
Part one of  the monograph focuses on the economic and social aspects 
of  village life in the area around the city of  Edirne and the southwestern 
Peloponnese. In the beginning of  this section, Parveva provides an overview 
of  the villages under examination in the area around Edirne, which she groups 
into three categories: villages belonging to vakıfs, timars and hases and included 
in the tax-farming (iltizam) system. Parveva offers a detailed analysis of  the 
structure, contents and dating of  land surveys of  the villages in the area around 
Edirne. She devotes particular attention to the Arab unit of  measurement, the 
cerib, which was used to measure and register the land in the villages, and how it 
compares to the Ottoman unit, the dönüm.
In the first chapter Parveva examines the everyday lives and festivals of  the 
population in the Edirne villages. The villages had 681 men on register, who 
were probably heads of  households (hane) and possessed and cultivated land. 
The majority of  the registered peasants had the status of  reaya. There were also 
representatives of  the ruling class (askeris) among the villagers. Their presence was 
relatively insignificant: 59 men, or 9 percent of  the registered village inhabitants. 
Four of  the villages in question were inhabited exclusively by Christians, while 
two others were inhabited exclusively by Muslims. The remainder were very 
small and were mixed in their religious makeup. Overall more than two-thirds 
of  the registered men in the villages were Christians (Bulgarians and Greeks). In 
addition to the local residents, the defters registered peasants from other villages 
or townsmen who had landholdings in these villages.
The chapter offers snapshots of  everyday life in the villages and the festivals 
held by the village people. It also reconstructs some of  the stereotypes regarding 
their attitudes and behavior. It highlights certain aspects of  the real and imaginary 
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worlds in which people lived, and this may help further our understanding the 
land-use patterns and agricultural activity of  the villagers. Parveva devotes 
particular attention to the village environment, the toponyms in the village 
boundaries as a bearer of  historical memory, and people’s perceptions of  and 
reactions to natural disasters and the deadly diseases of  the time. On the basis of  
contemporary accounts, she tells of  the guardians and villains in the imaginary 
world of  peasants and offers descriptions of  the holy places for Christians and 
Muslims from the area.
In the second chapter, Parveva addresses the issues of  reclamation and 
organization of  agrarian space within the territory of  the village. She studies 
the distribution of  land in the village territory and the methods and degree 
of  its reclamation within the framework of  Ottoman law concerning agrarian 
land. She also analyzes various sectors of  the village territory, including fields, 
vineyards, gardens, forests, common pastures, meadows and vacant fertile land. 
She examines various models of  behavior among village people in the processes 
of  land acquisition and the organization of  its cultivation, and she reveals the 
influence of  the urban center on the patterns of  reclamation of  agrarian land in 
the villages, both near and far, of  its hinterland. 71 percent of  the land that was 
suitable for sowing was cultivated. Aggregate data regarding the individual village 
territories show that in 67 percent of  the villages in question the process of  land 
reclamation was considerably advanced (between 65 and 97 percent) or had been 
completed. In the rest of  the villages (one-third of  the total number), the share 
of  reclaimed land was below 50 percent and was far lower in comparison with 
the villages from the first group. In fact, most of  these villages were situated 
in relatively mountainous areas and had large territories and common pastures, 
which made them more suitable for cattle-breeding.
The scarcity of  land in the villages was not an insurmountable obstacle to 
the economic activity of  farmers. In close proximity to their villages they had 
an additional stock of  land which offset the land shortage in their own territory. 
This was the arable land of  the mezraas, the müsellem çiftliks and the territory of  
neighboring villages that included lands that were still vacant and un-reclaimed. 
Strangers cultivated their scattered (perakende) fields in these lands.
In the third chapter, Parveva focuses on the yield of  grain crops and the 
productive capacity of  the raiyet çiftlik (çift). She offers a historical reconstruction 
of  the “model of  production” of  cereals in one raiyet çiftlik in the kazas of  
Arcadia and Anavarin on the basis of  villagers’ reports regarding the yield ratio 
of  grain, the tax legislation and the consumption rates of  cereals. According 
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to her findings, villagers in the southwestern Peloponnese applied a three-field 
system of  crop rotation as they cultivated their fields. They sowed wheat, barley, 
oats, millet and rye, but not all of  the villages had the full scope of  crops. Villagers 
sowed between 12 and 20 kile in one raiyet çiftlik. In a regular year, they harvested 
3.7 to 7 times more grain than they had sown. Wheat was not the dominant crop 
in the villagers’ fields and normally made up only about one-third or half  of  the 
harvest. The cereal harvest in the raiyet çiftliks in the two kazas was enough to 
feed the family, pay the tithe and the salariye, and put aside what was needed for 
sowing. Some quantity of  grain was left over, and this surplus ranged between 
10 percent and 45 percent of  the whole harvest. The surplus was biggest in the 
villages and çiftliks in the plain (32 percent to 45 percent). The harvest in the hilly, 
semi-mountainous and mountainous areas left much smaller surpluses, between 
10 percent and 16 percent. Both the quantity and the monetary equivalent of  the 
grain surplus varied from highs of  1,823 akçes in the flat areas to lows of  164–
272 akçes in the hilly and highland areas. Regarding the productive capacity of  
the raiyet çiftlik, there were deficits at times. For instance, the village of  Licudisi 
produced a harvest with an 18 percent deficit. 
This analysis is followed by a reconstruction of  the productive capacity of  
an average raiyet çiftlik in the kazas of  Arcadia and Anavarin. This time, the 
analysis of  the figures focuses on the grain surplus that was left in the farmers’ 
hands after they had paid their tithe and salariye and put aside what they needed 
for subsistence and for the next sowing. Villagers sowed an average of  16.9 kile 
of  grain in the fields of  a çift. This yielded a harvest of  92.5 kile (2.4 tons), or 
roughly 5.5 times as much. Nearly one-third (31 percent) of  this grain remained 
as surplus for the producer. The average monetary equivalent of  this surplus 
was 739 akçes. In the period in question, this amount was enough to cover the 
old regular monetary taxes (the poll tax, or ciziye), even after it was reformed and 
increased in 1691, and the ispençe. But it was not enough to cover the other levies 
of  the avarız category or the new set of  provincial taxes.
The quantified productive capacity of  the average raiyet çiftlik leads one to 
the conclusion that when the çift-hane system was developed and applied in an 
economic environment that was more favorable for villagers, it was easier to 
strike the desired balance of  production, consumption and taxation. Obviously, 
this balance was in jeopardy or already disturbed from the late sixteenth century 
on, when the Ottoman authorities, in response to the pressures of  frequent 
socio-economic, military, and political crises, transformed extraordinary taxes 
into regular annual levies and introduced a new set of  provincial taxes. The 
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inclusion of  these new levies and taxes in the annual tax list of  villagers created 
an opportunity to transform the average çiftlik from a surplus-making production 
unit into a deficit-making one.
In the third chapter, Parveva analyzes the agrarian strategies in the micro-
economies of  the various types of  settlements, depending on the environmental 
conditions, the production capacity of  the raiyet çiftlik, and the road and market 
infrastructure in the area of  the two kazas under examination in the southwestern 
Peloponnese. Chapter four examines the property characteristics and social 
profiles of  villagers in southeastern Thrace, i.e. the area around Edirne. The 
analysis of  the economic and social status of  peasants is based on the “model 
of  production” of  cereals in one raiyet çiftlik and the agrarian strategies that were 
adopted in the villages of  southwestern Peloponnese.
Data about the peasant landholdings in the hinterland of  Edirne bears 
evidence of  the existence of  a growing polarization in the distribution of  land 
among the members of  the rural community. This is seen in the comparison 
of  the size of  lands cultivated by the poor in each village and the lands of  their 
affluent fellow villagers. The difference is usually significant. This polarization 
is also evident in comparisons of  different villages when they are viewed as 
communities of  landholders. 
The first part of  this chapter examines the issue of  poverty among villagers 
and raises several major questions:
What were the specific causes of  poverty in a given village?
When did the Ottoman authorities designate a village as poor?
What terminology was used for this designation in the official records? 
What consequences were there for taxpayers and the Treasury when a village 
was designated as poor?
How did villagers conduct themselves in times of  impoverishment?
The authorities kept track of  the economic status of  the taxpayers at the 
level of  the settlement and not the individual household. In the official tax 
documents, the designations “poor,” “very poor,” and “extremely poor” were 
applied to a village the residents of  which, as a community of  taxpayers, were 
unable to pay part or all of  the taxes owed by the village. The quantitative 
parameters of  poverty in the villages and their residents in the nahiyes Üsküdar, 
Manastır and Çoke in the kaza of  Edirne are studied on the basis of  data from 
the avarız defters from the 1670s and 1680s. Overall, in 1676 only 7 percent of  
households in the three nahiye lived in villages that had been officially designated 
by the clerks as “poor,” “very poor,” or “extremely poor,” i.e. unable to pay part 
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or all of  the taxes due. An analysis of  the impoverishment of  the villages in a 
period of  some 20 years (1669–1686) reveals several patterns in this process. 
It becomes clear that poverty was brought about by long-term and short-term 
factors related to the changing economic and military-political situation and the 
hardships, crises or recoveries that accompanied them. An equally important 
role was played by natural disasters, which were often followed by poor harvests 
and deadly epidemics. 
The second part of  chapter four concerns the well-to-do peasants. The land 
defters of  the Edirne villages show that 29 percent of  the villagers with the status 
of  reaya cultivated two or more çiftliks: 20 percent cultivated 2 to 3.9 çifts and 9 
percent cultivated 4 to 12 çifts.
The prerequisites for the emergence of  this layer of  well-to-do peasants 
can be sought in the available opportunities for cultivation of  more land that 
could yield good crops, resulting in the production of  surpluses, which could in 
turn be sold on the market. This chain of  prerequisites could be supplemented 
by the surplus in animal husbandry and its commercialization. Parveva devotes 
particular attention to trade in grain and the participation of  villagers in legal 
and illegal commercial exchange. She explores the importance of  marketable 
agricultural products for the budget of  the peasant family and the role that 
was played by the village markets and fairs in the process of  selling the farm 
surpluses. 
In the last section of  chapter four, Parveva attempts to draw a profile of  
various professional and social groups in the rural communities. She outlines 
the property characteristics of  the religious functionaries (priests and imams), 
craftsmen, strangers (yabancı), former Christians who had converted to Islam, 
and women, and analyzes their landholdings and other sources of  income. She 
also studies the motives underlying their economic and social behavior.
Finally, a conclusion is made about the availability of  land that was suitable 
for cultivation. Along with the incentives and restrictions of  the economic, 
political and geographic milieu which created the preconditions necessary for 
property stratification of  villagers, there were fundamental reasons that did not 
allow for the accumulation of  wealth or property by affluent farmers to bring 
about any dramatic changes in the organization of  agrarian production and land 
use patterns or to occasion any consequent alterations of  the economic system 
or social order in the Empire. These reasons were enshrined in the Ottoman law 
regulating the principles of  land ownership and inheritance. As is well-known, 
the ultimate owner of  the land was the state, and peasants had only possession 
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rights. This legal regulation led to a number of  restrictions on the management 
and inheritance of  land and the inclusion of  land in real commercial exchange, 
money-lending transactions, and so on. This legislative philosophy provided the 
Ottoman authorities with a tool with which to maintain control of  land and 
ensure its cultivation in order to secure resources with which to implement their 
policies. At the same time, it deprived farmers of  any opportunity to acquire 
wealth based on privately owned and unconditionally inherited land and also 
precluded any economic initiative of  a larger scale, the introduction of  new 
crops, or any improvements in agricultural technology or competition.
In chapter five, Parveva focuses on the askeri çiftliks in the area around 
Edirne and the attitude of  the representatives of  the ruling class towards land 
and the agrarian sector of  the Ottoman economy. She begins by analyzing the 
quantitative characteristics of  the askeri landholdings according to data from the 
land surveys of  1669. This data reveal that the picture of  askeri çiftliks established 
in and around Edirne is not exceptional in terms of  the proliferation of  çiftlik 
agriculture in general and the scope of  individual çiftliks in the Balkans. Most 
askeri landholdings were small in size. Parveva analyzes the ratio of  askeri to 
reaya landholdings in the villages in order to determine the involvement of  the 
askeris in the process of  land reclamation in the village territory and establish 
the place of  the askeri çiftliks in the agrarian space under examination. When the 
21 villages and 2 mezraas are considered as a whole, one finds that 72 percent of  
the arable land belonged to the reaya landholdings and 28 percent to the askeri 
landholdings. This offers further evidence that the reaya peasants remained the 
main producers and landholders. Essentially, their economic activity supplied 
agricultural produce for the large consumers, the markets, and export. Although 
the intervention of  representatives of  the ruling class in agricultural production 
was obvious, the principles of  the imperial agrarian system, founded on the raiyet 
çiftlik, were not transformed. Parveva examines the inventories of  inheritances 
(tereke defters) of  three representatives of  the askeri group who held çiftliks in the 
villages. 
In the second section of  the book, Parveva addresses the issue of  land 
reclamation and organization of  the agrarian space in the town. This section 
consists of  two chapters. Chapter one focuses on the town of  Arcadia and 
chapter two on the towns of  Silistra, Sofia and Vidin. The two chapters offer 
a reconstruction and analysis of  the agrarian space in the Balkan town and the 
agrarian activity of  town dwellers in the period under examination. The data 
demonstrates the existence of  well-mastered and organized agrarian space in 
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the town. Despite the various opportunities for economic activity offered by 
the town, town dwellers maintained their interest in land cultivation. Attracted 
by the opportunity to supply the town market and the desire to avoid it when 
family subsistence was concerned, the townsmen invested capital, time and labor 
in the cultivation of  land and the breeding of  livestock. As a result, both large 
and small plots of  land were cultivated in the residential area and in the territory 
of  the town. For some town dwellers, agrarian activities were probably the main 
source of  income, while for others they were only an additional part of  the 
family budget. For still others, the landholdings were a matter of  wealth and 
social status.
The different priorities in the agrarian activity of  town dwellers and villagers 
predetermined the differences in the agrarian landscape of  the two types of  
territories. While the arable land in villages was reclaimed mostly for grain fields, 
the town’s land-use area was dominated by vineyards, gardens and meadows. As 
for the bread and fodder, the townsmen relied on the grains that were produced 
in the rural hinterland and sold on the urban markets.*
Gábor Demeter
* With the support of  the Bolyai János Research  Scholarship of  HAS.
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Hungarian–Yugoslav Relations, 1918–1927. By Árpád Hornyák. Boulder, 
Co: East European Monographs, 2013. 426 pp. 
In the second decade of  the twentieth century, the map of  Europe underwent 
radical, fundamental changes. The Austro–Hungarian Monarchy disintegrated, 
the Russian Empire suffered significant territorial losses before its ultimate 
collapse, and the Ottoman Empire was driven completely from the European 
continent. In the course of  these changes, entirely new countries came into 
being, which then strove to integrate into the European system of  diplomacy. 
The Kingdom of  Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was one of  these states. In 1918, 
Hungary became part of  the new European international constellation as an 
independent state for the first time in centuries. Though the reorganization of  the 
continent in the wake of  the war brought very different kinds of  consequences 
for each of  the two countries, both were compelled to address the question of  
integration into the new international order. The southern-Slav state was formed 
in December 1918, but was only recognized by the Allies over the course of  the 
following year, and this was a cause of  no small concern in its capital, Belgrade. 
Initially, only Serbia was officially invited to participate in the peace negotiations. 
As one of  the defeated powers, Hungary had to struggle for recognition, and 
a considerable amount of  time passed before it was able to pursue an active 
foreign policy.
In his new book, Árpád Hornyák, a scholar who has been studying 
Hungarian–Yugoslav relations for over a decade, examines the period between 
1918 and 1927. Logically, he begins with 1918, as this was the year in which, 
with the conclusion of  the war, a new era began. He chooses to end his inquiry 
with April 5, 1927, the date of  the signing of  the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of  
Friendship, because the period that followed bore witness to a qualitative shift 
in Hungarian–Yugoslav relations. The book goes in chronological order, and 
it consists of  three chapters. The first, which covers the period between the 
autumn of  1918 and the autumn of  1921, examines events up to the deposition 
of  the Habsburg House. The second covers the period from the deposition 
to the accession of  the two states into the League of  Nations, and the third 
concludes with the signing of  the Treaty of  Friendship by Italy and Hungary.
The last phase of  the war created an opportunity for leaders of  the Serbian 
national movement to achieve many of  their goals. These goals included 
the creation of  a country territorially larger than Serbia, incorporating into 
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a single state all southern Slavs. Following the armistice concluded in Padua, 
according to the Belgrade Convention (November 13, 1918) the southern 
border separating Hungary and the allies would run from the Mureş River in the 
east through the cities of  Subotica (Szabadka), Baja, and Pécs. The convention 
provided a legal foundation for the advances of  Serbian troops (which were 
already underway), who were ordered to reach the Szabadka–Baja line as soon 
as possible. (The liquidation of  the Hungarian administration of  Voivodina, or 
Vajdaság in Hungarian, also began.) With the delineation of  the demarcation 
line, in practice the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia was established. 
On August 1, 1919 the Supreme Council of  the Paris Peace Conference made its 
final decision regarding the border. Essentially, the Yugoslavs were satisfied with 
the resolution, though for months they continued to approach the Council with 
new propositions regarding modifications, always in vain. The border between 
the two countries was made international law with the conclusion of  the Treaty 
of  Trianon in 1920. 
Official ties between the two countries were only established in the late 
summer and autumn of  1919, when they concluded contracts concerning the 
transportation of  foodstuffs. Following the ratification by Belgrade of  the 
Treaty of  Trianon, the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia was able to assume 
his position in Belgrade. The Yugoslav government remained suspicious of  
Hungary, however. It accused the Hungarian government of  arming, and the 
attempts that were made by Charles I of  Austria to reclaim the throne exacerbated 
existing tensions. In August 1920, in order to hinder Habsburg restoration, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia concluded a collective defense agreement in 
Belgrade, thereby laying the foundations of  the Little Entente and strengthening 
anti-Hungarian policies. The treaty was ratified by the two countries in February, 
1921, and a few months later Romania joined the alliance.
Following the attempts by Charles to reclaim the throne, one of  Hungary’s 
primary goals was to become a member state of  the League of  Nations, since 
entrance into this body meant recognition by the new system. Following its 
accession, Hungary had opportunities to stabilize the country’s economy with 
the help of  loans from the League. In order for this to happen, the question of  
reparations had to be settled. Leaders in Belgrade felt that since Hungary was not 
willing to desist in its irredentist propaganda campaigns or military preparations 
for possible revision of  the Treaty of  Trianon, the country should be compelled 
to pay very high reparations. In their view, Hungary should only receive loans if  
the Hungarian government were to disarm completely (though the Hungarian 
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military hardly constituted a threat to the Little Entente) and the League were 
to monitor strictly the ways in which the monies were spent, for instance by 
allowing one of  the Little Entente states to delegate one of  the members of  
the committee overseeing the use of  the funds. As the conditions proposed by 
the Yugoslav government clearly indicate, the southern Slav state did not regard 
Hungary’s economic stabilization through the acquisition of  foreign loans or 
the de-sequestration of  the country’s capital as desirable. Yugoslav leaders felt 
that were it to be granted the loans, the Hungarian government would pursue 
revision even more resolutely. Yugoslav foreign minister Momčilo Ninčić stated 
this openly, saying that for Yugoslavia a poor Hungary was preferable to a 
wealthy Hungary, since a wealthy Hungary could be drawing into machinations 
against Serbia. With the addition of  certain conditions, the states of  the Little 
Entente eventually gave their consent and the loans were made. Yugoslavia was 
interested primarily in the question of  the continuation of  the transportation of  
coal and the delivery of  materials for the railway. In the end, the states of  the 
Little Entente did not insist on playing an active role in monitoring Hungary’s 
military or finances, and on March 14, 1924 Prime Minister István Bethlen was 
able to sign the documents that stipulated the conditions of  the loan. (At the 
same time, Yugoslavia was reaching an agreement with France regarding loans 
to purchase arms.)
Yugoslavia regarded closer ties with Hungary as potentially useful because 
of  the pressure that were being put on the southern Slav state by Italy, whereas 
for Hungary it was hoped that a rapprochement with Yugoslavia would facilitate 
the acquisition of  funds from the League of  Nations. In 1925, while the two 
states were pursuing negotiations regarding economic issues, Belgrade suggested 
that they also might begin talks regarding political cooperation. The idea of  
normalization relations with Yugoslavia found support in Hungarian public 
opinion as well. In 1926, Italy even called the attention of  the Yugoslav foreign 
minister to the possibility of  reconciliation with Hungary (while at the same time 
Italy threatened to treat Yugoslavia very differently if  the southern Slav state 
were to conclude a treaty of  friendship with France). Since in Yugoslavia at the 
time the supporters of  Yugoslav–Italian rapprochement were more prominent, 
there was hope that Yugoslav–Hungarian relations might improve. Following 
the franc forgery scandal (in 1926, Lajos Windischgraetz and Imre Nádosy were 
convicted of  having forged French francs in part to undermine the French 
currency but also to fund their irredentist efforts), the Hungarian government 
had to prove that it was not driven by revisionist designs and it sought to establish 
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and maintain good relations with its neighbors. By normalizing relations with 
Yugoslavia, the Hungarian government sought to demonstrate its intentions by 
example. On March 15, 1926, Bethlen met with the Yugoslav foreign minister 
and raised the possibility of  signing an arbitration convention. The negotiations 
went well, and over the course of  the summer, when circumstances had changed 
(Italy was again pursuing policies that were to some degree hostile to Yugoslavia, 
and Yugoslavia’s relationship with Greece had worsened), Ninčić began to take 
the idea increasingly seriously. In the fall, however, Budapest began to take efforts 
to win the good favor not of  Belgrade, but of  Rome. For Italy in the meantime 
had revived the Badoglio Plan, which had been made in the wake of  the war and 
which envisioned the encirclement of  Yugoslavia, and had offered to sign a pact 
with Hungary. For the first time in a long time, Hungary found itself  presented 
with a choice of  international allies, and the architects of  Hungary’s foreign 
policy chose to side with Italy, the great power that was discontent with the 
existing order. Towards the end of  the year (and particularly in the wake of  the 
signing of  a pact between Italy and Albania), support for a pro-Italian foreign 
policy in Yugoslavia faded. The new foreign minister revived policies that sought 
support in alliances with France and the Little Entente. Following the signing of  
the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of  Friendship, efforts to normalize relations and 
foster closer ties with Yugoslavia were broken off.
In addition to acquainting its readers with the bilateral negotiations and 
the various standpoints that were taken by the two states, Hornyák’s study 
very clearly demonstrates that one of  the most characteristic sentiments of  
the era was quite simply mistrust. For the government of  Yugoslavia, the most 
important task was to ensure the safety of  the northern and northwestern 
borders and to find an ally that could offer support against Italy. If  Yugoslav 
diplomats were to prove unable to find an ally (usually as a consequence of  a 
shift in or the weakness of  French foreign policy), they considered the ways in 
which they might eventually reach a compromise with Italy (although this would 
demand sacrifices and would occasion domestic political conflicts) and obtain 
a certain scope for action in the Balkans (one thinks of  the 1920 Treaty of  
Rapallo, the Santa Margherita Convention, the Rome Convention, and the Treaty 
of  Nettuno).  Yugoslav interests lay primarily to the south, and the southern 
Slav state was more concerned with pursuing an active foreign policy in the 
Balkans. Yugoslavia sought to reach the Aegean Sea through Thessaloniki and 
also hoped to exert more influence on Albania. It was also in constant conflict 
with the neighboring states, first and foremost Bulgaria, because of  disputes 
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over the Macedonian question. Because of  these many concerns, for Yugoslav 
foreign policy the territories of  Central Europe were the priority. In the interests 
of  securing its border with Hungary, preventing a Habsburg restoration, and 
ensuring that it would have reliable allies, Yugoslavia was one of  the founders 
of  the Little Entente and remained an active member throughout the period. 
The Yugoslav government always strove to prevent Hungary from becoming 
economically stronger and consistently opposed any effort to allow Hungary to 
rearm. 
Hungary’s new conception of  foreign policy began to take form during 
Bethlen’s tenure as prime minister, following the unsuccessful attempts of  Charles 
I of  Austria to reclaim the throne. Bethlen and his government believed that it 
was necessary to adapt to the situation that had been forced on Hungary by the 
Treaty of  Trianon. They felt that the country had to begin or rather continue to 
pursue a policy of  concord and compromise, while at the same, if  circumstances 
were to shift in Hungary’s favor, certain territories might be recovered (first and 
foremost with the assistance of  a stronger Germany). Attempts to foster close 
relations with Yugoslavia were always motivated in large part by the desire to 
loosen the bonds that held the Little Entente together. Of  the three states of  the 
Little Entente, Yugoslavia seemed to offer the most promise in this regard, since 
in comparison with Romania and Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia had acquired the 
smallest compact Hungarian territory and for some reason of  the nationalities 
in question the Serbs were held in the highest regard by Hungarian leaders 
(perhaps because of  the reputation of  the Serbs as a defiant nation that had 
fought against Ottoman occupation). At the same time, Hungary did not regard 
the friendship with the new southern Slav state as everlasting. To the architects 
of  Hungarian foreign policy, it seemed preferable to have not a large southern 
Slav state of  13,000,000 people to the south, but rather several smaller states. In 
private, they hoped that the Kingdom of  Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would fall 
apart, and sometimes they even supported groups in Yugoslavia that shared this 
goal (though without success). However, Hungary, which never abandoned the 
goal of  undermining the unity of  the Little Entente, also considered it important 
to find a great power ally. In 1927, with the signing of  the Italian–Hungarian 
Treaty of  Friendship, Hungary seemed to have reached this goal.
Hornyák’s study, the style of  which is vigorous and animated, bears ample 
testimony to thorough scholarly research. Hornyák pursued research in archives 
in Hungary, Serbia, and England, and he has brought to light and compared 
a number of  new sources. He presents the shifting relations between the two 
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countries on the basis of  a vast wealth of  facts and carefully attempts to elucidate 
causal relationships. He also goes into detail regarding the circumstances that 
shaped relations between Hungary and the southern Slav state, the plans of  
the great powers regarding Central Europe, and the responses of  the states of  
Central Europe to these plans. He examines the tools that were available to the 
great powers in their efforts to blunt the often excessive demands of  the smaller 
countries of  the region (for instance monitoring the ways in which loans made 
by the League of  Nations were used). He draws the attention of  his reader 
to innumerable facts that have failed to become part of  common knowledge 
among Hungarian historians. For instance, in his presentation of  Italy’s policies 
regarding the Balkans he explains why Yugoslavia was not able or did not want 
to devote more energy to the region of  Central Europe. In many cases, Hornyák 
complements or makes more precise assertions that have been made in the 
Hungarian secondary literature, and he offers valuable observations regarding 
current scholarly debates. One could mention, as an example, the section of  
the book in which he examines the shifts that took place in the views of  Mihály 
Károlyi, who served briefly as prime minster and then president of  the short-
lived Hungarian Democratic Republic in 1918–19, regarding Wilson’s principle 
of  national self-determination. Károlyi lost his faith in Wilson’s ideas when 
he was confronted with Serbia’s demands and the conduct of  the other great 
powers. Hornyák also presents how, given the changes in the circumstances, 
Miklós Horthy and his government were perceived in Yugoslavia. The book 
acquaints the reader with the particular perspectives and considerations that 
emerged in the evolution of  Yugoslavia’s stance. In the formation of  its foreign 
policy, Yugoslavia had to confront the problem that it was compelled to represent 
the interests of  a diverse array of  territories. For instance, it was important 
to Yugoslav politicians to know whether or not prominent political circles in 
Hungary were pro-Serb or pro-Croat. Lazar Bajić’s 1919 report discerns “Serb” 
and “Croat” tendencies within Hungarian foreign policy.  
One can only hope that Hornyák will continue his inquiries and will study the 
developments of  later periods with the same thorough and penetrating attention 
to detail. The subsequent periods, and in particular last years of  the 1930s and 
first years of  the 1940s, were also marked, from the perspective of  foreign 
policy, by the search for ways out of  complex entanglements. Hornyák’s book 
represents a new and valuable contribution to Hungarian historiography, since 
the community of  historians does not yet have comprehensive monographs on 
relations between Hungary and each of  the neighboring states. The publication 
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of  this book in English enables readers who do not speak the languages of  
Central Europe to acquaint themselves with the most recent findings and will 
further the emergence of  more nuanced interpretations that incorporate a wider 
array of  perspectives and approaches. 
Translated by Thomas Cooper
László Bíró
